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ABSTRACT
This paper studies the effect of foreign aid on economic stabilization. Following Alcsina
and Drazen (1991), we model the delay in stabilizing as the result of a distributional struggle:
reforms are postponed because they are costly and each distributional faction hopes to reduce its
share of the cost by outlasting its opponents in obstructing the required policies. Since the delay
is used to signal each faction's strength, the effect of the transfer depends on the role it plays in
the release of information. We show that this role depends on the timing of the transfer foreign
aid decided and transferred sufficiently early into the game leads to earlier stabilization; but aid
decided or transferred too late is destabilizing and encourages further postponement of reforms.
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The transition from central planning to the market in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union has been characterized by a host of economic difficulties. Prominent among these are
large budget deficits leading to rapid rates of monetization and high inflation. Inflation has
distorted relative prices, disrupted embryonic markets and undermined support for reform.
While the need for stabilization is cleat, observers disagree about the political and economic
prerequisites for bringing it about. One debate concerns the role of foreign assistance. On
one side are those who argue that Western aid can play a critical role in halting Inflation'.
External resources, they argue, can defuse distributionaJ conflicts over the tax increases and
spending cuts needed for fiscal balance and stabilization. By moderating the swdfices
required of those who agree to beat the cost of stabilization, aid cart hasten adjustment. On
the other side are those who argue that aid will only delay the adoption of the requisite
policies.2 Financial assistance, they warn, reduces the pain of living with inflation. By
endowing vested interests with additional resources, aid will encourage them to resist
adjustment and put off the day of reckoning.
The literature does not offer a systematic analysis of the validity of these points of view.
Providing a first step towards such an analysis Is our goal in this paper.
Malyzing the impact of aid on the timing of stabilization requires us to posit an explanation
for the persistence of the inflation that is the policy problem. Given the prominence of
distributional considerations in the arguments of advocates and opponents of Western
stabilization alike, we employ a theoretical set-up In which distributional conflict is key. In a
recent article, Jesina and Drazen (1991) have provided such a model. They analyze Inflation
persistence as the byproduct of a distributional war of attrition between interest groups2
uncertain about the capacity of their rivals to bear the costs of inflation. ftJthough all interest
groups understand that restrictive policies will eventually have to be adopted, and although all
groups suffer while stabilization is being delayed, each one has an incentive to resist the
adoption of the relevant measures since it hopes that another group will capitulate first and
bear the entire burden of adjustment. Inflation therefore persists until the weakest faction
concedes.
We argue that this set-up captures the essence of the mechanism underlying many of the
inflations whose persistence has prompted discussion of foreign aid. For example, the
German hyperinflation of 1923, in response to which the Dawes Loan was offered to buttress
stabilization, is commonly interpreted in terms of a distributional conflict between German
industrialists who demanded reductions in real wages and increases in hours of work to
finance reparations payments, and workers who pressed for a capital levy or other forms of
wealth taxation to raise the requisite funds.3 Other post World War I Central and Eastern
Europe inflations, in response to which stabilization loans were extended, are similarly
interpreted in distributional terms. The Polish inflation, whose end in 1926 coincided with a
credit granted by a consortium of foreign central banks, for example, is commonly described
as the outgrowth of a struggle between workers and capitalists.' Our analysis of inflation and
stabilization in post World War II France and Italy similarly concludes that reform was
posponed because of a distributional conflict between capital and labor and assigns to U.S.
aid a pivotal role in bringing about the ultimate stabilization. Schengreen and Uzan(1992)
argue that the Marshall Plan defused distributional conflict and facilitated stabilization not only
in Italy and France but in many of the European countries receiving American aid. To citeyet
another example, distributional conflicts figure prominently Incases, in Latin America and
elsewhere, where IMF stand-by loans have been proposed as a means of encouraging
stabilization.' And the distributional interpretation of inflation in Russia and otherpost-Soviet3
republics hasbeenencouraged by evidence of increasing income inequality, tw avoidance,
and disputes between enterprise managers andfinanceministry officials over inter.enterprise
arrears, all of which has fed the debate over the efficacy of foreign aid.
Since frlesina and Drazens model is familiar, we adopt their formulation. Our innovation is
to add foreign aid. The critical assumption is that aid is not extended instantaneously upon the
advent of inflationary pressures. This assumption is both critical to our results and - we believe
- eminently plausible. Whether to provide financial assistance to a foreign country struggling
with inflation is always a contentious issue. First the existence of an inflation problem must be
identified. Then the case for aid has to be made. A coalition supporting it has to be formed in
the donor country. Finally a mechanism has to be created for delivering the assistance. Each
of these steps is a source of delay between the onset of inflation, the announcement of aid and
its arrival. Such delays feature prominently in virtually all instances where foreign assistance
has been provided. In the case of the Dawes Loan, Germany had suffered several months of
inflation before a Committee of Experts was appointed; the Dawes Loan was then raised in
1924, months after stabilization commenced. The countries of Central and Eastern Europe
experienced prolon9ed inflations before the League of Nations and foreign governments made
credible offers of financial assistance. General George Marshall's speech at Harvard University
in ,June 1947, making the case for the Marshall Plan, culminated a long deDate within the U.S.
government over the advisability of aid and preceded by six months Congressional debate of
the proposal. Similariy. the merits of Western aid to Russia were discussed for more than a
year before the G-7 countries assembled a package of $24 billion in mid-1992. Since then
debate has continued, and at the time of writing the bulk of the funds has yet to be disbursed.
In our analysis, the effects of aid turn out to hinge on precisely these Issues of timing.
Although some delay is inevitable, our conclusion4s that too long a delay makes aid
counterproductive. id announced and disbursed relatively rapidly can hasten stabilization.4
Aid which is offered too late has the opposite effect.
This result obtains because a foreign transfer has two conflicting effects. On the one hand,
the knowledge that aid will eventually be forthcoming can encourage early stabilization by
lightening the fiscal burden on the faction whose acceptance of a larger share of taxes brings
about the stabilization. The cost of stabilization will be less if some fraction of the budget
deficit is closed by foreign aid; this encourages the group least able to endure continuous
inflation to agree to underwrite the remaining gap. On the other hand, the delay which ensues
between the announcement of aid and its disbursai provides an incentive for each faction to
postpone offering concessions until the assistance actually arrives. Since the sacrifice required
to effect stabilization is larger before the aid arrives than after, each group has an incentive to
wait until the assistance materializes. For each group, the relative importance of these two
effects depends on the costs of inflation, lithe costs of inflation are high, then the first effect
dominates: the reduction in the cost of conceding is sufficient to bring forward the optimal date
of concession. If instead such costs are low, then it is optimal to wait for the transfer.
If the transfer is announced in the early phases of the inflation, even interestgroups which
suffer greatly from price instability would not have conceded yet. They would now find it
optimal to concede at once. If no concession occurs, all groups can deduce that their
opponents do not experience very high costs of inflation: the release of information is
accelerated. On the other hand, if aid is announced late In thegame, everyone knows that all
groups will then prefer to wait until the transfer is disbursed: the announcement delays the flow
of information arid the date of stabilization. In conclusion, when stabilization Isdelayed by
each group's belief that it may be able to outlast Itsopponents, the result of any Intervention
depends on its effect on the transmission of Information, Aid may serve as a revelation
mechanism whose effectiveness depends on appropriate timing.
As this discussion makes clear, we do not model the conditions that donor countriesattachto foreign aid. The effectiveness of conditionality Is a disputed Issue, however, and the most
accurate way of specifying it is unclear. And from a logical point of view it seems natural to
begin by studying the simpler case of unconditional aid.
Section II of the paper lays out the basic model, wtiile Section III Introduces foreign aid.
Section IV discusses the sensitivity of the results to specific assumptions of the model, and
section V concludes.
II. STABIUZATION IN AWAR OF AURITION MODEL
Aiesina and Drazen describe an economy where government deficits are financed by
distortionary taxes (a proxy for inflation) which impose welfare losses to consumers. These
welfare losses differ across consumers types, are private Information and could be avoided if
consumers agreed to 'stabilize' the economy, that Is If an agreement emerged on higher (but
not distortionary) taxes or lower government transfers. The authors assume that the costs of
stabilization are borne unevenly, with the group conceding first incurring the largest share. In
equilibrium, each faction hesitates to concede, hoping to outlast Its rivals. Although a fully-
informed social planner would stabilize immediately, delay is lndMdually rational.
The model can be summarized briefly.
(1) The game staris with a given stock of outstanding bonds (b0), and a given level of
primary government expenditures (go). For simplicity, g0 is constant forever. Prior to
stabilization, in each period a proportion p of total government spending Is financed by
distortionary taxes, the rest by new bond issues. At time t. total public expenditure f Is:
I, = rbe' (1)
where r is the constant Interest rate, bb. + gc/r, and the exponential term captures the
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accumulation of debt overtime. Taxes at time t r1, are therefore
= p rbe"' (2)
(2) There are two consumers, both earning the same constant Income y and paying an
equal share of taxes in each period. Besides reducing consumers disposable incomes, taxes
cause distortions which result in utility losses. These losses are assumed proportional to the
amount of taxes but different across consumers; they are captured by a parameter 0. which is
private information.
In equilibrium, each player consumes his disposable income. Ignoring the income term
(which is constant), the two players flow utilities each period (before stabilization) are:
u=.(9,+ 1/2)prbe°'" 1=1,2 (3)
0 lies between known extremes Q and 9. Both players estimate the opponent's cost 0
according to the density function f(0) and cumulative probability distribution function 90).
(3) At the date of stabilization T, non.distortionary taxes become available and are raised so
as to cover all fiscal expenditure. These taxes are divided unequajly between players, with the
player conceding first - the 'loser - shouldering a larger tax burden forever. The tax shares of
the 'loser and the winner are a (larger than 1/2) and (1.a), respectively. With public
expenditure completely financed by taxes, debt subsequently remains constant, as do totai
fiscal expenditures and taxes.
Since taxes are non-distortionanj, the only utility loss following stabilization is that associated
with the reduction in disposable income, flow utility at time I Is:
U' = a rbeT
(4) U" = - (1-a) rbe°'4"7
where L denotes the loser, W the 'winner. The shares a and(1-a) simply multiply totai fiscal
expenditures at 1. Since no new debt accumulates overtime, flow utility remains constant for
both players forever. Discounted lifetime utility evaluated at T Is:
V(=.abeoT
(5)
V = - (1-a) be""
(4) Each players problem is simply described. In each period, he can concede and bring
about stabilization by agreeing to pay higher taxes forever. Alternatively, he can wait, hoping
that his opponent will concede but enduring distortionasy taxes in the interim. The solution of
the game is a function T(6) mapping the idiosyncratic cost of living in the destabilized
economy 6 into an optimal time of concession T. In equilibrium. I Is such that the marginai
benefit of conceding at T instead of at T + dt equals the marginal benefit of waiting:
(-u + U' - dV'fdT) = H(T.OJ (r-Vt) (6)
where H(T,6J is the probability that the opponent concedes between T and T + dt, given that
he has not yet conceded, and is given by:
I(9J
1 Hff,O=- — (7)
F(6J T(eJ
where the prime sign indicates the first derivative.
Substituting the functional forms assumed above and concentrating onthe symmetric




The additional assumption > a - 1/2 9uaranteesthatall types 9 > Q concede in finite time.
As shown by (8), and as usual in wars of attrition, the optimal concession time I depends
negatively on 9: the higher is the idiosyncratic cost from distortionajy taxation, the eajiier a
player concedes.
Moreover, the player with the highest possible cost. 8, concedes immediately, since he
knows that any other type will wait at least a bit. Therefore:
1(E) = 0 (9)
The differential equation (8) together with the boundary condition (9) completely characterize
the symmetrical equilibrium. If, for example, the distribution of 0 is uniform between Q and 9,
(8) and (9) imply:
(2a-1) 0+1/2-a 0-8
[In — -ln_ J (10)
rp(Q+l/2-a) 0+1/2-a 9-Q
This function is shown in Figure 1.
III. STABIUZATION AND FOREIGN AID
We now study the effect of a foreign transfer on the expected time of stabilization. We
model the transfer as accruing to the government, not directly to consumers, an assumption
consistent with the historical episodes described In Section I. Assume that at time v foreign aid
arrives in the country. It is used to withdraw a proportion (1-8) of outstandinggovernment debt
and to reduce internal financing of direct public expenditure by the same proportion (1-8), with
13 between 0 and 1. For simplicity, the reduction in direct public expenditure is assumed to9
continue forever.' From time v onward, total fiscal expenditure Is then given by:
f1=I3rbe" tv (11)
It is simple to verity that conditions (8) and (9) remain unchanged: the optimal time of
concession does not depend on the size of the budget and therefore is invariant with respect
to changes in fiscal policy. The assumption that the welfare costs of distortlonaiy taxes are
directly proportional to the tax bill implies that the level of fiscal expenditures cancels out in
equation (8): a cut in public spending has an identical effect on the marginal benefit of
conceding and on the marginal benefit of waiting. Since in addition fiscal retrenchment does
not affect the boundary condition, unanticipated foreign aid has no Influence on the timing of
stabilization. We discuss this point further in Section IV.
In point of fact, foreign aid hardly occurs as an unexpected event. It Is demanded
repeatedly by the prospective recipients and is the subject of bargaining and debate. We
therefore turn next to the case of anticipated aid.
Suppose that at time s it is announced that aid will arrive (with certainty) at time v.' As
before, aid will be used to withdraw public debt and reduce internal financing of public
expenditure. If stabilization has not taken place by time v, after the transfer has arrived the
game continues along the path described by equation (8).
Consider the players' problem in the interval between s and v. Immediately following the
announcement and before the transfer has arrived, the welfare loss from distortionary taxes
and the one-period cost of conceding are unchanged, sInce the level of government spending
to be financed remains the same. However, lifetime utilities after the stabilization are affected
by the knowledge that public spending will be reduced from v onward. If the date of
stabilization I falls in the interval between s and v:-
= - a bettT [1.(1-6)e']10
TE [svj (12)
'I" = - (1-a) be"'T [1-(1-6)e]
Define:
a(t)1 -(1 -13)e '' t E fs,vJ (1 3)
a(t) is always positive but smailer than 1 • is decreasing in t and equals B when t equals v.
The anticipation of the transfer has two effects. First, since the loser Will finance the larger
share of public spending after stabilization, the anticipation of foreign aid (which reduces the
fiscal burden) diminishes the marginal cost of conceding. Ceteris paribus, this should hasten
stabilization. At the same time, however, since deficit reduction takes place only after the aid is
transfered, there is an incentive to postpone conceding until closer to that moment. The
overall influence on the time of concession is determined by the relative weight of these two
considerations.'0
Let T(O) denote the function describing the optimal time of concession in the interval





Assume for the moment that the denominator is strictly positive. Comparing (14) to (8), the
slope of the function T(0) is smaller than the slope of 1(0), in absolute value, if and only it:
(0+1/2)p-2a
> (0-t-112)p.2a (15)
Since aft) is always smaller than 1, condition (15). Is satisfied when:
(O+l/2)p> 2a (16)11
independently of the value of 13. We have no a priori reason to believe that (16) should be true
for all 0.
To conclude the characterization of the equilibrium, we must consider the possibility of a
jump in the optimal path of concessions following the announcement of the transfer. Such a
jump could have two causes. First, we have assumed so far that the denominator of equation
(14)is strictly positive, which occurs if:
(O+1/2)p> 2a - cza(1)(2-p) (17)
Condition (17) need not be satisfied. If it is violated, the marginal benefit from conceding Is not
positive: even if a player knows with certainty that his opponent will not concede, he still gains
from delay. Since a(T) fails as I rises, it at a given moment In time (17) Is violated for all B In
the game it will continue to be so in the future. In usual wars of attrition, this would mean that
the game has come to an end, with no possibility of further concessions. Here the situation is
complicated by the knowledge that the game will change at time v, returning to the path
defined by equation (8). Since 0 is larger than (a-112), all players will eventually find it optimal
to concede after time v. Imagine a player knowing with certainty that he will concede exactly at
v, before his opponent: if (17) is violated he will nonetheless have no incentive to concede any
earlier. The change in the game when the transfer is conveyed makes possible sri expected
discontinuity that is usually ruled out in wars of attrition.
A second possible source of discontinuity is a change in the boundaiy condition at the time
the transfer Is announced, triggering a probability mass of concessions. Since the
announcement is unexpected, there is no reason to exclude this possibility a priori. A change
in the boundary condition could occur if new information about the opponent's type is
revealed, or if a player's cost from staying In the game has changed sufficiently that he prefers12
to concede even with a positive probability of winning in the next instant. In our formulation,
however, no new information about the opponent is reveaied at the time of the announcement,
and no player ever wants to abandon the game. It follows that this second source of
discontinuity can be ruled out.
Organizing these results, we can evaluate the effect of an expected transfer on the timing of
stabilization. From time 0 to s, the solution to the game is described by (8) and (9). At times.
the marginal player who is just indifferent between conceding and waiting is of type 6.. where 0.
is defined by:
T(9J=s (18)
Similarly, 9,, the player just indifferent between conceding and waiting at the moment the
transfer is disbursed, is defined by:
T(9,) = v (19)
We can distinguish three cases.
Case 1.
Suppose 0. is such that:
(O.+1/2)p2cr (20)
Then, the marginal benefit from conceding is strictly positive for all 9 larger or equal to 0, and
T(6) is well-defined and decreasing in 0. Since v is larger than s, 0. must be smaller than 6..
Therefore:
(O.+112)p>2a (21)
Two results follow. First, (20) implies that (17) Is satisfied for all 9larger or equal to 0.. and the13
path of concessions has no discontinuities. During the interval between a and v, this path Is
described by (14) and by the boundary condition:
T(8J = S (22)
After v, the relevant equations are (8) and
T(6.) = V (23)
Second! the delay before stabilization is unambiguously shortened by the provision of aid.
Since the game continues with the original slope after time v, whether stabilization Is hastened
or delayed depends on th! steepness of the function T(6) between s and v, relative to the
steepness of the original function fle). Condition (20) guarantees that 1(8) Is flatter than the
original function at all points in the relevant interval: following the announcement of aid, the
optimal time of concession is lower for all 0. and stabilization is unambiguously accelerated.
This case is depicted in Figure 2a."
Case 2.
Suppose instead that 8. is such that:
(0.+112)p s 2a (24)
(which implies that (20) is violated). There are two possibilities. First, it may be that:
(0.+112)p> 2a -oo(s)(2p) (25)
In this case, the marginal benefit from conceding is strictly positive at 0.., and T(0) Is well•
defined at the time the transfer is announced. Suppose there exists a 8, smaller than 0.. for
which the marginal beneilt from conceding isO (i.e. for which (17) Is violated). Then on the
path defined by T(0) the optimal delay belore concession for 0 Is infinite. Since T(0) is14
continuous in e, the slope of the optimal path tends to infinity asymptotically as 0 approaches
8'. But then by construction 8. must be larger than 9'. and T(O) must be well-defined for all 8
between 8. and 8.. In other words, if there is any lump it must occur at time s when the transfer
is first announced. Therefore (25) is sufficient to rule out discontinuities In the path of
concessions: if (25) is satisfied, the path of concessions is defined by (14), is continuous, and
the boundary conditions at times s and v are (22) and (23), as before. However, (24) Implies
that T(8) is steeper than the original function between s and v, and the conclusion must be that
the transfer delays stabilization. (See Figure 2b).
On the other hand, if equation (25) is violated, announcement of the transfer causes a
discontinuity. Since all players still in the game must have costs lower than 8., the marginal
benefit of conceding is negative for all of them and continues to be negative as time passes
arid a falls. It follows that no one concedes between s and v. At time v, when the transfer
takes place, the path of concessions starts again, as described by (8) and the new boundary
condition:
1(8,) = v (26)
Again, stabilization is delayed by the transfer (see Figure 2c).
Case 3.
An intermediate case exists when (21) is satisfied but (20) is violated:
(8.+l/2)p 'C 2a (27)
In this case, discontinuities are ruled out (since (21) implies (25)), and the new path Is flatter
than the original one at s but steeper at v, The transfer may accelerate or postpone
stabilization. (See Figure 2d).
These conclusions can be summarized In the following proposition:15
Proposition A. The announcement at time s of a foreign transfer to anive at time v may
accelerate stabilization only if (9.+ 1 /2)p > 2a, where 9. is defined by equation (18). The
transfer accelerates stabilization with certainty if (9.+112)p2a, where 0. Is defined by
equation (19).
Proposition A states that equation (21) is a necessary condition, and equation (20) a
sufficient condition, for hastening stabilization.
At this level of detail, it is difficult to make reasonable empirical guesses on the support of
the parameter 9 and evaluate the likelihood that (20) and (21) will be satisfied. However, while
the positive implications of the model remain ambiguous, the normative implications are simple
and clear. Since both T(O) and T(9) are monotonic in 9, Proposition A can be rephrased as
follows:
Proposition A'. If there is a delay between the time foreign aid is announced and the time it Is
disbursed, then there exist two dates s' and v (s cv) such that foreign aid announced after s
will delay stabilization, while aid disbursed before V will hasten it. s is the solution to: T(O) =
s, and V to: 1(9) = V. where (9+1/2)p = 2a.
Proposition A' states that foreign aid can accelerate stabilization but that proper timing Is
essential: aid announced or delivered too late is counterproductive.
The result is particularly simple because a' does not depend on the size of the transfer.
Whatever its amount, the announcement that aid is coming must be made before a critical date
that depends on the structure of the economy, as captured by the parameters r, p, a and the
support of 9."
Proper timing is essential not only in announcing aid but also In delivering It. A full
characterization of the critical delivery date V is complex since, unlike s', V depends on the
size of the transfer." Regardless of the size of the transfer, however, the longer Is the interval
between announcement and disbursal, the higher Is the probability that aid will delay
stabilization. But shorter intervals accelerate stabilization only up to a point; as the Interval16
grows short, the length of time during which the effects of the expected transfer are left is also
reduced, and the impact on the timing of stabilization tends to disappear.
Although the size of the transfer is of secondaw importance1 it is not Irrelevant. A larger
transfer (a smaller 13) causes a decline in a(t). As shown by equation (15), thIs accentuates the
difference in the slope of the original path 1(9) and the new path 1(0) that is followed between
s and v. Two implications follow. First, the larger the transfer the higher the return from getting
the timing right. If the announcement of aid comes too late and conditIon (21) is violated, the
expected date of stabilization is delayed longer the larger is the size of the transfer.
Conversely, it the timing of both announcement and disbursal Is chosen correctly, the date of
stabilization is hastened more the larger is the transfer. Second, the larger the transfer, the
shorter must be the interval between announcement and disbursaj for stabilization to be
hastened, Suppose the transfer has been announced eazly enough, so that 1(8) is flatter than
the original path at 0.. Then the critical moment when the marginal player is of type 0 is
reached easlier, and from that moment onward 1(8) is steeper than the original function. The
larger the transfer, the larger the difference in slopes at time 5, and the eadier the moment
when 1(8) becomes steeper than 1(9). Therefore, the larger is the transfer, the shorter must be
the interval between announcement and disbursal for condition (20) to be satisfied.
Why is timing so important? As mentioned above, a transfer has two effects: it lowers the
lifetime cost of conceding by reducing the fiscal burden on the Iose at the same time it
increases the marginal benefit of postponing concession until the transfer has arrived, since
this means avoiding a number of periods when still-high fiscal deficits must be financed by the
loser. The relative importance of the two effects depends on the welfare costs of dlstortlonasy
taxation, If these costs are high, the first effect dominates: even taking Into aàcount the
temptation to wait until the transfer arrives, the reduction in the cost of losing is sufficient to
accelerate concession. If. on the other hand, the costs ofdlstortlonary taxation are low, it17
makes sense to hold out longer in order to approach the time when the cost of losing is
reduced by the arrival of aid. When the transfer is announced and disbursed early, high cost
players are still in the game. For them the first effect dominates: eaziler concession is now
optimal, and if no concession is observed each player has additional information with which to
update his estimate of his opponent's cost. When high es are still in the game, the
announcement of a transfer hastens the rate at which information about types is conveyed.
But if the announcement is late, players already know that both have relatively low costs. Such
players will want to wait for the transfer to arrive and the fact that no concession takes place
conveys little new information about the opponent's type. Stabilization is delayed because the
acquisition of information is slowed down. To summarize, timing matters because an expected
transfer creates different incentives for high and low cost players. As a result, the transfer
affects the rate at which information is revealed, accelerating stabilization if the timing is correct
but delaying it otherwise.
We conclude our discussion with a few remarks on the role of the parameters a and p.
While equations (20) and (21) make clear that the values of a and p influence the results, In
general their impact is ambiguous. Consider first a, which we interpret as a measure of the
polarization of society, following ftjesina and Orazen. The higher is a - the more costly it Is to
concede - the higher 9, and 9. must be to satisfy (20) and (21). At the same time, the hIgher Is
a the slower is the rate of concession in the original game, and therefore the higher is the 9
characterizing players still in the game at any point in time, Since these two effects work In
opposite directions, the length of time alter which foreign aid becomes counterproductive may
become longer or shorter as the distributional fight becomes more polarized. The same
reasoning applies to p. The larger p - the greater the recourse to dlstortlonaiy taxation -the
lower 9. and 9. must be to satisfy (20) and (21). But the larger p the higher the origInal rate of
concession, and the lower the Idiosyncratic costs borne by players stlU In the game at any18
given time. Again, it is not clear whether greater recourse to distortionary taxation advances or
delays the date after which aid is counterproductive."
IV. DISCUSSION
.Alesina and Drazen built their model with the goaj of analyzing a rational delay in
stabilization as the outcome of a distributional war of attrition. Other models could produce
similar results. Bargaining models are a natural alternative, where delay could result from
incomplete information (as in, for example. Admati and Perry, 1987) or from the richness of the
players' strategies even when information is complete (as in Femandez and Glazer, 1991). In
our opinion, however, the representation of the problem as a war of attrition is sufficiently
faithful to historical experience to be the appropriate starting point.
How sensitive are our results to the particular simplifying assumptions adopted by Alesina
and Drazen? As they note, the main weakness of their model is the absence of money: while
it is natural to interpret the distortionary taxes financing the deficit before stabilization in terms
of inflation, no explicit monetary mechanism is present For our purposes, this has two
implications. First, the specification of the welfare costs of inflation is arbitrary. The model
provides little intuition about the right way to link those costs to the size of the deficit. Second,
and more troubling, the model excludes the role of expectations: a reduction in public deficit
causes a commensurate reduction in distortionary taxation at exactly the moment it occurs and
has no effect before that time, even if it Is anticipated.
The full specification of a monetary economy Is beyond the purposes of this note. Here we
limit ourselves to a few observations.
With respect to the first point, the proportional link between distorlionary taxation and
welfare costs is responsible for the conclusion that unexpected transfers have no impact On the19
date of stabilization. However, we can easily think of other specifications under which this
result would be modified. Suppose for example that we wanted to capture the intuitive
scenario where welfare costs rise less than proportionally with inflation for low inflation rates,
and more than proportionally with high inflation rates: welfare costs are initially concave and
then convex in distortionary taxation. Since different agents have different abilities to protect
themselves from the distortion, both the level of the costs and the threshold of inflation
corresponding to the inflexion point of the costs function depend on the agents' type. In a
simple linear approximation, the specification of flow utility before stabilization becomes:
Ut = - max (0. t ÷ 9-c) - 1/2 t Vt1> 0 (3')
where c is a constant. The costs of distortionary taxation are positive only when it rises beyond
a certain threshold that depends on 9. A necessary condition for an unexpected transfer to be
stabilizing is that its impact on the deficit is larger than its impact on welfare costs for the
rnarginai player willing to concede at the time the transfer takes place. With specification (3'),
this condition amounts to requiring &> c, where 9. characterizes the marginal player at the
time the transfer is effected: players with sufficiently high welfare costs must still be in the game
when the transfer occurs. Once again, this is equivalent to a restriction on timing: for aid to be
stabilizing it must be disbursed sufficiently eacly."
More generally, a transfer will accelerate stabilization if its effect on future deficits Is larger
than its immediate effect on inflation. Thus it is more likely to hasten stabilization in an
economy where inflation has an inertial component (due for example to the existence of long
term nominal contracts). Since inertia tends to disappear as the economy approaches
hyperinflation, we expect aid to be more effective in addressing distributional conflicts when
inflation Is not yet out of control. Despite their Impressionistic nature, these considerations
support ow- condusion on the importance of timing.20
We have derived rigorously such conclusion in the analysis of an expected transfer, and it Is
in this context that Ignoring expectations can be particularly misleading. It Is important to show
that the result is not modified when we allow the public discussion of a future transfer to affect
immediately expectations of future monetization.
Suppose that each player's welfare costs depend not only on the current level of
distortionary taxation but also on his expectations of future distortionary taxes. Consider player
i, whose optimal concession time is T and specify his flow utility before stabilization as:
= - (0+1/2) t -0 [(Prob T(0J ￿ T) J r.e1' ds + I
(3")
rr"
+ Jj t.e ds f(S) dSJ (IWTI<flI
where the probability that the opponent is more patient (Prob T(0JT4) is conditional on him not
having conceded as of time t, and where the discount rate r is large enough to guarantee that
u, is falling in 0 for all t - a condition now not automatically satisfied. The terms in square
brackets in equation (3") sum to the discounted stream of expected future distortionary taxes,
which depends on the expected date of stabilization, itself a function of the probability that the
opponent is more patient (the first term in the brackets) or less patient (the second term) than
player i. This specification leads to results that are in fact identical to those of the previous
section. The intuition is simple: at the margin each player considers the cost of postponing
his concession by evaluating the welfare cost of staying In the game for another Instant at time
1. But at time T his expectation of future distortions Is necessarily zero since thegame is
ending: only the present distortion matters. The marginal condition must be identical to the
one derived above. As long as the problem is well-behaved and the boundary condition
unchanged, we are back to the set-up studied in the earlier section of the paper. An21
announced future transfer affects flow utilities before stabilization but still leads to the same
marginal condition. Mowing for forward-looking expectations does not affect our
conclusions."
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has analyzed the conditions under which foreing aid can help to accelerate
stabilization. We have modeled the persistence of inflation as the byproduct of a distributional
war of attrition. In this model, the policies of adjustment needed to hail the inflation are
delayed not because their need is unappreciated but because each distributional faction seeks
to shift the cost of implementation onto its rivals. We show that the timing of foreign assistance
is critical in conditioning its effects. Aid announced and disbursed relatively early in the
inflation process can accelerate stabilization, while aid announced or delivered after a
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1. See for example Allison and Yavlinski (1991) and Sachs (1994).
2. A representative statement of this view is Eberstadt (1992).
3. For details, see Maier (1975), Elchengreen (1992) and Feldman (1993).
4. See Sargent (1966) and Santaella (1993).
5. See for example Rothschild (1992), pp. 53-54.
6. Casella and Elchengreen (1993). The view that distributional struggles were responsible for
delayed and contradictory policy measures is shared by other authors. See for example De
Cecco (1968) and Do Cecco and Giavazzi (1993).
7. See for example the contributions to Williamson (1983).
8. If aid is used only to withdraw public debt, or only to finance direct government expenditure,
the mathematical expressions are less simple but the substance of the analysis is unchanged.
9. Throughout the paper, we assume that the disbursement of the transfer takes place at a
given date with certainty. Uncertainty may be added to the analysis, but the more interesting
its source the more complex the extension. If there is uncertainty about whether or not the
transfer will take place, but it is known that if the transfer takes place at all it must take place at
v, then the problem is identical to the discussion in the text, with a minor reinterpretation.
However if the date of the trasfer is uncertain, then the analysis changes non trivially because
estimates are updated with the passage of time. Note also that although the transfer Is certain
to occur at date v, the receiving country is not allowed to borrow immediately against It. The
constraint seems realistic.
10. In symbols, and referring to equation (6), the first effect causes a decline in the term (P-
V), the second an increase in d"fldT.
11. Given the time of the announcement s, the impact Is largest if v is chosen so that (20)
holds with equality.
12. A simple example makes the point immediately. Suppose the distribution of 9 is uniform
overthe interval (1,101, r = lopercent,p = I (all fiscal expenditure before stabilization is23
financed with distortionaty taxes) and a = I (the loser shoulders the entire fiscal deficit). Then
equations (10) and (21) imply that any foreign aid, of whatever size, must be announced before
12.8 periods have elapsed. The interest rate is the anchor implicitly defining the length of the
period. It enters the expression in a simple multiplicative fashion: for example, if all other
parameters are as in the text but the interest rate is halved to 5 percent, the maximum number
of periods is doubled to 25.6. If we ignore compounding, the presence of the Interest rate
insures that the arbitrary choice of the length of the period does not affect the result.
13. Notice that T(O) depends on (3.
14. A little more can be said if we assume a specific distilbution for 9. For example, if the
distribution is uniform, equations (10) and (21) Imply that I increases with a if p is low, but falls
as a rises if p is high. On the other hand, s' fails monotonically with p. The lack of a closed
form solution for T(6) prevents us from adding anything on the link between a, p and ¶f.
1 5. Notice that 9.> c implies a negative threshold for distortions: i.e. distortionary taxation is
costly for type 9. even if it is very small, as long as it is positive. For all 99. welfare costs
have a discontinuity at i=0. The restriction 6> c - ;(3/2 - a). implying that welfare costs are
positive for all players already at time 0, is sufficient to guarantee that the the game is well-
behaved.
16. The counterintuitive conclusion that expectations do not matter depends on the
assumption that welfare costs are a function of IndMdual expectations of future distortions
which can then be manipulated by individual action (concession). Notice that these
expectations, although rational, differ between the two players since each one knows his own
idiosyncratic cost 9. An alternative specification would have the expectation of future
distortions, which is the proxy for inflation, be formed by an outside observer. Each player
would take this expectation as given and could not affect it be conceding, and expected future
events would appear in the marginal condition. However, if an equilibrium strategy exists, we
believe that the substance of our conclusion would not be modified. Suppose that the timing
of the transfer were such as to induce eaalier stabilization, ignoring expectations. The shorter
horizon reduces future expected distortionary taxes and therefore current welfare costs and the
incentive to stabilize. But in equilibrium the effect of expectations cannot be strong enough to
delay the expected date of stabilization: othewise the horizon would be longer and the
incentive to stabilize even stronger than without expectations. In other words, the change In
the slope of the T(8) function in response to news of a future transfer may be reduced but
cannot switch sign. We find the assumption of an external observer forming expectations that
directly affect individual utility very artificial and do not pursue It further.24
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